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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 24, 1987, Toyota Motor Company announced plans to
market a line of luxury automobiles under its new Lexus brand.1 By that
time, the Lexis computer-assisted legal research service was well
established and widely known by attorneys and accountants across the
country.2 Mead Data Central, owner of the Lexis mark, promptly sued
Toyota.3 Why would the owner of the Lexis trademark be so concerned
with Toyota’s choice of Lexus? The two marks are spelled the same
with the exception of one vowel, but more importantly, they sound
nearly identical when spoken out loud: Lexis legal research service and
Lexus luxury automobiles. Consumers familiar with both trademarks
have likely made this mental association. In fact, when Toyota Motor
Sales was brainstorming names for its new division in 1986, two Toyota
attorneys familiar with the Lexis mark noted the similarity.4 But no
person seeing the Lexus trademark would think the automaker is in any
way affiliated with the Lexis legal research service. It is highly unlikely
that a consumer would be confused about whether Lexus automobiles are
produced by Lexis or whether Lexus offers legal research services.
Because a trademark infringement claim requires a likelihood of
consumer confusion,5 Lexis would have a difficult case to make were
infringement the sole cause of action available.6

1. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1031,
1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev’d, 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989).
2. Id. at 1036.
3. Mead Data Central sued for infringement under federal law and dilution under
the New York state dilution statute. Id. at 1035. Congress did not enact the first federal
dilution statute until 1996. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98,
109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)).
4. Mead Data Central, 702 F. Supp. at 1034. Toyota later searched and concluded
that Lexus would not infringe the Lexis mark; however, its attorneys did not consider the
possibility of dilution. Id.
5. The reader should understand any reference to “confusion” in this legal sense
and equate consumer confusion with the infringement cause of action. See generally 15

546

JOCHIM FINAL POST-AUTHOR PAGES (2) (PRE-AUTHOR PAGES)

[VOL. 47: 545, 2010]

7/19/2010 9:24 AM

Federal Trademark Dilution Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Nonetheless, although consumers will easily perceive that products
and services from Lexus and Lexis derive from different sources, they
may now make two mental associations upon seeing either of these
marks.7 When Lexus entered the market, the Lexis mark theoretically
went from occupying a solo position in the minds of legal professionals
to sharing mental space with an automobile manufacturer. The mark
Mead Data Central had invested heavily in promoting and making
known to the legal community thereby lost an unquantifiable amount of
value.8 It is this mental association, which is followed eventually by
economic injury to the holder of a famous mark, that comprises the
cause of action for trademark dilution.9
It has been just over eighty years since Frank Schechter announced the
theory underlying modern dilution law.10 Schechter posited that—
contrary to the historical view of trademarks as mere indicators of source
without intrinsic value—marks play a much more direct role in the
marketing and sale of goods and services.11 Trademarks are agents for
the creation of goodwill, and it is the power to uniquely identify a
particular source that gives them value.12 According to Schechter, a
famous trademark’s ability to serve as a goodwill generator is injured
when it loses “distinctiveness,” as others using the same mark to identify
U.S.C. § 1114 (2006) (setting forth the federal infringement statute). Infringement is an
entirely separate cause of action from dilution, which is the subject of this Comment.
See infra Part II.
6. The district court in Mead Data Central held that there was no likelihood of
consumer confusion between Lexis and Lexus. 702 F. Supp. at 1039.
7. See id. at 1044. Initially, the district court granted Mead Data Central, owner
of the Lexis mark, an injunction under the New York state dilution statute. Id. at 1044–
45. However, the Second Circuit reversed the dilution finding and lifted the injunction.
Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1032 (2d Cir.
1989).
8. See Mead Data Central, 702 F. Supp. at 1044. The Mead Data Central court
found that the plaintiff had invested $3.8 million in advertising and promotions in 1987,
generating over $200 million in revenue that year. Id. at 1042.
9. See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and
Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 519–20, 522 (2008).
10. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV.
L. REV. 813, 825–26 (1927). Some commentators point out the modern law does not
closely reflect Schechter’s vision. See, e.g., David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution
Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American
Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117, 164 (2004) (suggesting that current dilution law
does not accurately reflect Schechter’s original views).
11. See Schechter, supra note 10, at 814, 816.
12. See id. at 818.
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unrelated products join it in the marketplace.13 Although initially slow
to catch on, the United States has since seen the rise of the dilution cause
of action beginning with state dilution statutes,14 followed by the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA),15 and most recently with the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA).16
Yet despite multiple attempts to clarify the proper meaning, purposes,
and application of dilution theory, there remains a dissonance between
the underlying theory and the current state of federal dilution law.17 The
TDRA currently applies to marks widely known to the general consuming
public across the United States, a standard this Comment refers to as
“general fame.”18 It bestows the power to exclude not only junior uses
within the same area of commerce but to any use of the same or a
substantially similar mark.19 Rights may attach regardless of whether
third parties have previously copied the mark or the owner has diluted its
own mark through licensing.20 In effect, the TDRA confers rights on
trademark owners that cannot possibly benefit from its theoretical
protections, while simultaneously excluding owners of marks that would
benefit from the practical competitive advantage dilution law provides.
In contrast to traditional trademark infringement,21 dilution law exists
primarily to protect the interests and investments of mark owners.22 This

13. Id. at 829–30.
14. Franklyn, supra note 10, at 125. The first state dilution statute was enacted in
Massachusetts in 1947. Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, § 7a, 1947 Mass. Acts 300, available at
http://www.archive.org/stream/actsresolvespass1947mass (codified as amended at MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 110H, § 13 (2006)).
15. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)).
16. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730,
1730–32 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)). These developments have been well
documented. See generally 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:67 (4th ed. 2009); 4 id. § 24:77 (describing state dilution law
and general dilution theory); Michael E. Fox, Judicial Interpretation of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Revision Act in Its First 16 Months, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J.,
June 2008, at 1 (recounting development of FTDA, TDRA, and related case law).
17. See supra note 10.
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006) (defining a “generally famous mark” as
“widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of
source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner”).
19. Dilution provides for an injunction against any junior use that is found to blur
or tarnish the senior mark, irrespective of the presence or absence of consumer confusion. Id.
§ 1125(c)(1) (2006).
20. See infra notes 61–62.
21. Traditional trademark infringement is based on consumer-minded goals, such
as protection against deceitful business practices. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 2:14
(quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989)). The
classic situation is when a seller “palms off” inferior products under the name of a
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right departs from the traditional purposes and policies of trademark law
by affording what more closely resembles an exclusive property right in
trademarks.23 Because the dilution claim—at least in theory and when
properly applied—grants such broad rights, it is important to ensure it is
available only to a “small, elite group of truly renowned” and strong
marks.24 Part II of this Comment explains why, under a proper
understanding of dilution theory, federal dilution law should apply only
in situations in which there is no likelihood that consumers will be
confused as to source.25 Part III contends only coined marks that are

superior competitor. See, e.g., O. & W. Thum Co. v. Dickinson, 245 F. 609, 621 (6th
Cir. 1917) (inferring intent to palm off defendant’s sticky fly paper as that of the plaintiff
when defendant copied plaintiff’s product packaging). The law is designed to encourage
competition by enabling customers to identify and purchase goods and services that have
met their standards of quality in the past. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 378 (2d ed. 1980) (“If there were no brand
names and trademarks, the consumer might never be sure who made a product and
would have difficulty rewarding through repeat purchases manufacturers who achieve
high quality or cater to his or her special tastes.”).
22. See, e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003)
(“Unlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are not
the product of common-law development, and are not motivated by an interest in protecting
consumers.”), superseded by statute, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L.
109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)).
23. Trademark law is designed to afford only a limited scope of rights, though protection
may last indefinitely. The scope of trademark rights, rather than being exclusive, is
defined by consumers’ mental perceptions. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 2:14. The
infringement claim applies to junior uses that create a likelihood of consumer confusion
as to whether the junior use actually emanates from, is sponsored by, or is otherwise
affiliated with, the source of the senior mark owner. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114. In contrast,
“[d]ilution causes of action, much more so than infringement and unfair competition laws,
tread very close to granting ‘rights in gross’ in a trademark.” Avery Dennison Corp. v.
Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1999)
(referring to Schechter’s dilution theory as a “radical . . . proposal, whose practical effect
if fully adopted would be to create as the whole of trademark-protection law property
rights in gross in suitably ‘unique’ marks”), overruled in part by Moseley, 537 U.S. at
433; Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1031,
1041–42 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Section 368-d [of the New York dilution statute] recognizes
that the distinctive quality of a trademark is a property right and the cause of action is
more akin to the tort of trespass.”), rev’d on other grounds, 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir.
1989); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 24:72 (“Antidilution law has a strong
resemblance, not to the law of consumer protection, but to the law of trespass on
property.”).
24. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 24:67.
25. This Comment discusses fame only in the context of the dilution by blurring
cause of action. Dilution by tarnishment is defined in the TDRA as an “association
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unique in the marketplace should have access to the dilution claim.
Restricting the cause of action in this manner will help to ensure dilution
law is available only to those marks that truly deserve it. Notwithstanding
these restrictions, a suitable dilution cause of action should be available
to certain deserving marks that are currently excluded under the TDRA.
The principal focus of this Comment is to advocate expansion of the
fame requirement to encompass trademarks that are known across the
entire United States and within a broadly defined product or service
market niche.26 Part IV proposes a set of guidelines for defining market
niche fame. It also presents an affirmative argument as to why this
particular group of marks deserves access to the dilution cause of action.
To confront popular arguments against niche fame, Part V addresses
how state dilution statutes and the infringement cause of action offer
inadequate protection for nationally famous market niche trademarks.

arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms
the reputation of the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2006). Tarnishment
cases raise issues of free speech and parody more frequently than blurring cases, and are
left out of the discussion to avoid distracting from this Comment’s main focus on fame.
See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 464 F. Supp. 2d 495,
505 (E.D. Va. 2006) (rejecting tarnishment claim by maker of Louis Vuitton handbags
after finding defendant’s Chewy Vuiton dog toys to be a successful parody), aff’d, 507
F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183,
1192–93 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (finding that defendant’s posters reading “Enjoy Cocaine”
harmed plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill, and denying defendant’s free speech argument
when posters imitated plaintiff’s familiar “Enjoy Coca-Cola” trademark). The reader
should understand references to “dilution” in this Comment to encompass only dilution
by blurring. Professor McCarthy argues that tarnishment is a separate type of injury
from that caused by dilution by blurring. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 24:89. Unlike
blurring, tarnishment of a mark could occur either simultaneously with dilution by blurring, or
simultaneously with a likelihood of confusion case. Id.; see also Warner-Lambert Co. v.
Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming trademark infringement
claim and finding likelihood of tarnishment when defendant distributed plaintiff’s Halls
cough drops that had passed their freshness date). In fact the Coca-Cola court appeared
to embrace the view that a brand could be both infringed and tarnished concurrently
when it cited with approval plaintiff’s argument that its “good will and business
reputation are likely to suffer in the eyes of those who, believing it responsible for
defendant’s poster, will refuse to deal with a company which would seek commercial
advantage by treating a dangerous drug in such jocular fashion.” 346 F. Supp. at 1191
(emphasis added).
26. For purposes of this Comment, the terms mark and trademark should be read
to encompass both trade and service marks. The term market niche fame refers to those
marks famous within a particular product or service market segment and excludes marks
famous within a restricted area of the country––termed as a geographic niche. The
Comment does not advocate expansion of the fame requirement under federal law to
include trade and service marks famous only within a geographic niche.
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II. ENDING THE CONFUSION OVER DILUTION
The theory of dilution by blurring holds that the owner of a famous
trademark suffers harm if an identical mark is used by a less famous,
unaffiliated owner to identify a source of noncompeting goods or
services.27 Yet the TDRA allows owners of famous marks to plead
dilution in cases in which the accused mark is used on competing
goods.28 The problem is that this renders the dilution claim largely
redundant of the infringement cause of action.29 In essence, the only
additional element an owner must show is that its mark is generally
famous.30 Under a proper understanding of dilution theory, blurring may
occur only in situations in which there is no likelihood of consumer
confusion.
Dilution properly applies when identical or nearly identical marks are
used to designate sources of unrelated products or services, and there is
no likelihood of consumer confusion.31 To illustrate, compare the marks

27. Schechter, supra note 10, at 825; see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 16,
§ 24:72 (referring to dilution as a situation in which one mark identifies two distinct
sources and contrasting it with infringement, which presents the consumer with similar
goods bearing similar marks that generate confusion as to whether the products emanate
from the same source). Even the first federal dilution bill, which was unsuccessfully
introduced in 1988, adopted the view that an action for dilution is properly limited to
application against noncompeting goods. S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 7 (1988), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5583 (“The provision is specifically intended to address a narrow
category of famous registered trademarks where the unauthorized use by others, on
dissimilar products for which the trademark is not registered, dilutes the distinctiveness
of the famous [mark].” (emphasis added)).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006) (“[T]he owner of a famous mark that is
distinctive . . . shall be entitled to an injunction . . . regardless of the presence or absence
of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.” (emphasis
added)).
29. In fact, all but one of the successful dilution cases decided in the year following
enactment of the TDRA also held that the junior use infringed the senior mark holder’s
rights. Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from
the First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 449, 450 (2008) (“For all of the legislative and academic
attention paid to it, antidilution law continues to have no appreciable effect on the outcomes
of federal trademark cases or the remedies issuing from those outcomes.”). This analysis
suggests that, as currently applied, dilution’s property rights may not in fact be as potent
as many fear.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
31. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 24:114 & n.7 (referring to instances of junior
mark use on unrelated and noncompeting goods as “the traditional ‘blurring’ model”);
accord Instrumentalist Co. v. Marine Corps League, 509 F. Supp. 323, 332 (N.D. Ill.

551

JOCHIM FINAL POST-AUTHOR PAGES (2) (POST-AUTHOR PAGES)

7/19/2010 9:24 AM

Delta and iPod. Delta serves as a trademark for a variety of completely
unrelated products and services, ranging from sink faucets to an airline
service. Upon seeing a Delta faucet, a consumer may make a mental
association to Delta airlines, but he knows instinctively that the two are
in no way affiliated. The faucets are not produced by the airline service
or vice versa. Nonetheless, as the number of unrelated users adopting
the mark rises, the consumer is increasingly distracted from the famous
mark by the awareness of multiple unaffiliated sources.32 This is an
example of one mark used to identify two or more sources, the definition
of dilution by blurring.
Now take Apple Computer’s highly successful branding campaign of
adding “i-” before many of its products—think iPod MP3 players, iMac
computers, and iPhone cellular telephones. When a consumer sees a
product that begins its mark with “i-,” he thinks of Apple products. So,
when that consumer sees an accessory for iPod music players called
iTrip, he naturally assumes Apple must also make this product. In fact, a
completely different company makes the iTrip radio adapter.33 Here, the
consumer is likely to be confused as to whether Apple makes the iTrip
product. Even if he knows Griffin Technology makes the iTrip radio
adaptor, the consumer is probably confused as to whether there is some
affiliation between the two companies: perhaps Apple has licensed its
technology, its trademark, or both. Although the products are not direct
competitors, they operate in the same realm of related goods, and thus
the brand similarity spawns confusion.34 This situation, in which the
consumer is unsure as to whether the brands are somehow associated, is

1981) (“Illinois case law indicates the [dilution] statute was intended to operate only where
relief is unavailable under traditional theories of unfair competition, under which likelihood of
confusion and the existence of competition are usually requisite elements.”), aff’d, 694
F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1982).
32. McCarthy calls this a problem of “one mark: two sources.” 4 MCCARTHY,
supra note 16, § 24:69; id § 24:72 & n.14 (“The confused consumer believes that the
actor’s use of the mark is connected with the trademark owner, and thus for such
consumers the use does not dilute the distinctiveness of the mark.”); accord Am. Express
Co. v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 310, 316 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (“In order for dilution to
occur, the consumer must have a reasonable basis upon which to (1) associate the
disputed mark with the plaintiff, and (2) not be confused into thinking that the plaintiff is
the source or sponsor of the challenged goods.”).
33. Griffin Technology produces the iTrip accessory. Griffin Technology, Products,
http://www.griffintechnology.com/products (last visited Apr. 24, 2010).
34. Proximity of goods is one of eight factors employed in an infringement
analysis. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). This
factor weighs increasingly toward a finding of infringement the more the junior user’s
goods resemble those of the plaintiff. Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141,
150–51 (2d Cir. 2003).
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distinct from the Delta airline and faucet scenario. Infringement law
covers the former situation and dilution the latter.
Unfortunately, the term dilution used in the vernacular suggests a
watering down or decreasing of potency.35 Mark owners have capitalized
on this by substituting dilution’s ordinary connotations for its meaning
as a legal term. Many have successfully argued that any use that confuses
as to the source of a mark must necessarily weaken that mark.36 It would
follow from this logic that a finding of infringement must also be
evidence of dilution.37 Judging by their success, this suggests many
courts apply dilution law in the sense of weakening of a strong mark,
without considering Professor McCarthy’s “one mark: two sources”
blurring rationale.38
But if the dilution cause of action is truly redundant of the
infringement cause of action, it would not make much sense to expend
the resources creating and discussing dilution law in the first place.39
The “one mark: two sources” theory of dilution law—the concept behind
the blurring cause of action—cannot be coextensive with the “multiple
marks, associated with one source” injury of traditional infringement

35. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
508 (4th ed. 2000); accord Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp.
1189, 1208 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (describing the “essence of dilution” as “the watering down of
the potency of a mark” and finding both infringement and dilution by blurring).
36. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 219 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“Consumer confusion would undoubtedly dilute the distinctive selling power of a
trademark. . . . We can see no reason not to apply the antidilution statute to use on
competing or closely related products, where likelihood of confusion, and thus
infringement, might also be found.”), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,
Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 426 (2003), superseded by statute, Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2006, Pub. L. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)). In his
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., concurrence, Justice Kennedy similarly infused
infringement concepts into his infringement analysis by asserting that the injury dilution
seeks to prevent is “a mark [that] will erode or lessen the power of the famous mark to
give customers the assurance of quality and the full satisfaction they have in knowing
they have purchased goods bearing the famous mark.” 537 U.S. at 435 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
37. See Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1037 (9th Cir. 2007)
(finding dilution by blurring based largely on evidence of consumer confusion: “Not
only does the infringing use create a ‘mental association’ in the consumer’s mind
between Horphag’s product and the product Garcia sells, but indeed, the evidence shows
that some consumers believed they were purchasing Pycnogenol—with its good will and
reputation—when they purchase Garcia’s product”).
38. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
39. See Beebe, supra note 29, at 467.
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law.40 The consumer is either confused as to whether a product emanates
from the famous source or he is distracted from the famous source by the
entry of unrelated sources onto the marketplace.41 A proper application
of dilution theory requires that dilution by blurring be available only to
noncompeting or otherwise unrelated goods if there is no likelihood of
consumer confusion.
III. INFUSING DISTINCTIVENESS AND UNIQUENESS LIMITATIONS
INTO DILUTION LAW
Given the strong property rights dilution law theoretically affords, it is
only appropriate to introduce limitations to bring the law into conformity
with its stated purpose of protecting the distinctiveness of famous
marks. 42 Limiting dilution claims to marks that are both highly
distinctive and unique in the marketplace will further this purpose while
allowing for expansion of the fame requirement to encompass famous
niche market trademarks.
A. Limit the Dilution Claim to Coined or “Quasi-Coined” Marks
The dilution claim should only be available to marks that are coined or
“quasi-coined”; that is, terms that the mark’s original owner invented
and introduced to the public.43 Requiring that marks be coined or quasi-

40. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
41. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 24:72. This is not to say that a plaintiff could
not theoretically plead both infringement and dilution. It is possible that in a given case,
some consumers would be confused and others would not be confused as to the source of
the particular good or service. The Third Restatement of Unfair Competition provides that
infringement and dilution may be pleaded as claims in the alternative or cumulatively, so
long as the plaintiff can show that a substantial number of consumers are likely to be
confused and also that a separate substantial number are likely to experience blurring.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. f (1995).
42. Schechter and others have used the term distinctiveness to refer to both the
strength of a mark in the sense employed in the infringement analysis and in the sense of
uniqueness within the marketplace. See Schechter, supra note 10, at 829–30
(using distinctiveness to indicate uniqueness in the marketplace). However, to
distinguish between these two meanings, this Comment uses the term distinctive in its
legal sense as employed in the infringement analysis. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768–69 (1992) (outlining distinctiveness inquiry for purposes of
trademark and trade dress infringement analysis). This Comment uses the term unique to
refer to marks that represent the sole use of a particular term in the marketplace.
43. Professor Franklyn defines coined words as “completely made-up words—i.e.,
words that simply did not exist before they were invented by the trademark owner.
Kodak is an example; Xerox is another.” Franklyn, supra note 10, at 162–63. Quasicoined words are defined as “words that are partially comprised of invented components.
Polaroid is such a word. It did not exist before the camera company invented it, but it is
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coined will greatly reduce, if not eliminate, concerns over free speech
and monopolistic rights.44 It will reinforce the notion that only those
marks that most deserve such strong property rights receive them. And
it will provide a far more efficient screening mechanism for courts to
eliminate nonmeritorious claimants at the early stages of litigation.
Prevalent throughout trademark law is a concern that the ability to
prevent others from using certain terms will limit free speech by
plucking words out of the collective vocabulary and creating “lawful
monopolies” on the English language.45 This consideration is particularly
relevant to dilution law because some fear the ability to exclude junior
uses in noncompeting fields will effectively remove words from the
public domain.46 But coined and quasi-coined marks add to, rather than
take away from, the common vocabulary.47 Requiring this high level of

not wholly made-up either. It includes the known word polar. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently
distinct and creative to include it in the category of marks that are eligible for expansive
trademark protection.” Id. at 163. Frank Schechter envisioned his theory would apply
only to famous marks that were coined, arbitrary, or fanciful, if the junior mark was
identical to the senior mark, and if the uses were for dissimilar or noncompeting goods.
Schechter, supra note 10, at 828–30. Famous examples include Rolls-Royce, Kodak,
Mazda, and Blue Goose, which he contrasted with self-laudatory, suggestive marks such
as Blue Ribbon and Star. Id. at 827, 829–30. Schechter envisioned coverage of a
broader scope of marks than this Comment advocates. Fanciful marks would fall within
this Comment’s proposal to limit dilution protection to coined or quasi-coined marks.
However, the law would not encompass arbitrary trade and service marks—terms that
already exist but which the mark owner applies to an unrelated product, such as Ivory
soap. See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir.
1983), overruled in part by KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,
543 U.S. 111, 116 (2004).
44. See infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
45. See E. Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir. 1943).
46. See, e.g., Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 37 (2005) (statement of Marvin J. Johnson, Legislative
Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid= f:98924.pdf (concluding that the
TDRA “alters the dynamic tension between trademark holders and free speech in favor of
trademark holders” and “obstructs the public’s ability to freely engage in a democratic
dialogue”); cf. Jesse A. Hofrichter, Note, Tool of the Trademark: Brand Criticism and
Free Speech Problems with the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1923, 1940–57 (2007) (asserting the TDRA expands dilution rights and will have
a chilling effect on speech critical of mark owners).
47. See, e.g., Nat’l Fruit Prod. Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499, 506
(D. Mass. 1942) (“As to marks derived from coined words, the establishment of what is
loosely called a monopoly presents no possible threat to competitors or to the public.”
(emphasis added)), aff’d, 140 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1944).
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distinctiveness will provide added incentive for users to be creative in
conceiving source designations. In turn, the public benefits when mark
owners enrich the common vocabulary.48
Although the commonly stated policy behind intellectual property law
is enriching the public domain, a vein of natural rights policy also runs
through the law.49 Commentators often discuss dilution in terms of
those marks that deserve or have earned strong rights through the
owner’s “ingenuity and the merit of his wares or services.”50 Limiting
protection to coined and quasi-coined marks will satisfy a societal
impulse to reward mark owners for their creative and temporal
investments.51 This will help to ensure that only those marks whose
owners have truly “earned” additional rights through a significant
investment of resources enjoy access to the dilution claim.

48. As an example, the Google search engine began as just that, an Internet
searching service. Although the noun google is not coined, with the immense popularity
of the search engine, people began using the term as a verb: it is now common
to “Google,” rather than “search for,” a topic online. In fact, many dictionaries include
“Google” as a verb. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, GOOGLE, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/google (2010).
49. For example, one commentator notes:
[T]here is an understandable tendency to develop robust doctrines of individual
moral entitlement even within the social policy framework. This is due in part
to the fact that natural rights ideas have never really been lost sight of in
intellectual property law . . . . Natural rights formed part of the dialectical background
to the emergence of modern copyright in eighteenth century England, they are
heard in an undertone throughout the American case law, and they figure
prominently in recent scholarship on the subject.
Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in
Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN LAW
114, 120 (David Vaver ed., 2006) (footnotes omitted).
50. Schechter, supra note 10, at 833; see Franklyn, supra note 10, at 141.
51. See Franklyn, supra note 10, at 147–48.
The more [a mark] appears to be a common, descriptive, or already existing
word, the less we are inclined to protect it against any and all free-riding. This
inclination is based, in part, on our collective notions of labor and reward. We
have inherited the general Lockean notion that the reward of property should
follow some type of expenditure of labor. We are not inclined to give people
strong property rights when they expend little or no effort in creating something of
value. By contrast, we are inclined to give relatively greater property rights to
people who expend labor to invent new things.
. . . It takes a degree of intellectual labor and creativity to invent a new word
for use as a trademark and to then make that invented mark famous. By
contrast, it takes relatively little effort to simply pluck an existing word from
the known and obvious lexicon of existing words and to then make that word
famous. In short, we are inclined to believe that the invented word somehow
belongs to its creator in a way that does not necessarily apply to the plucked
word.
Id. (footnotes omitted).

556

JOCHIM FINAL POST-AUTHOR PAGES (2) (PRE-AUTHOR PAGES)

[VOL. 47: 545, 2010]

7/19/2010 9:24 AM

Federal Trademark Dilution Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Excluding all but coined and quasi-coined marks is more than just
theoretically sound. This distinctiveness requirement will serve the
practical purpose of efficiently reducing dilution litigation by creating a
bar to standing that is simple to apply. In an older case, Savin Corp. v.
Savin Group, the Second Circuit explained that one of the primary
reasons for refusing to extend the FTDA to famous niche marks was to
reduce the number of lawsuits.52 As that court stated,
[T]he element of fame is the key ingredient. This is because, among the various
prerequisites to an FTDA claim, the one that most narrows the universe of potentially
successful claims is the requirement that the senior mark be truly famous before
a court will afford the owner of the mark the vast protections of the FTDA.53

Members of Congress similarly expressed hope that the TDRA’s new
general fame requirement would reduce dilution claims to those rare
circumstances in which it properly applies, rather than as an alternative
pleading in every infringement case.54 Without doubt, reduction of
dilution litigation was a goal both for Congress and courts applying the
federal statutes.
But reducing litigation via the general fame requirement is an
inefficient means of achieving this objective because it requires
extensive evidence gathering before a judge may rule on any pretrial
motions. The TDRA contains a four-factor test for fame that considers
evidence, including the “duration, extent, and geographic reach of
advertising” of the mark; the “amount, volume, and geographic extent of
sales” under the mark; and the “extent of actual recognition of the
mark.”55 Unless judges determine fame solely on the basis of gut
52. Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 449 (2d Cir. 2004).
53. Id.
54. H.R. REP. NO. 109-23, at 25 (2005) (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman,
Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_reports&docid=f:hr
023.109.pdf.
55. The TDRA lists four factors to be used in determining whether a mark is generally
famous:
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of
the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties.
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services
offered under the mark.
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006).
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reactions—which certainly is not desirable—such evidence requires
inquiry into sales records and company financial information, as well as
conceivably requiring some form of customer survey.56 Many potential
plaintiffs, including nonfamous product or service mark owners, are still
likely to attempt a dilution claim despite this new requirement.57 The
amount of evidence a plaintiff must gather, as well as the extent of
evaluation involved—assuming the fame determination is not a gut
reaction—is not an efficient first step to reducing litigation. Conversely,
requiring dilution plaintiffs to establish that their marks are coined or
quasi-coined is an efficient means of limiting the litigant pool. Whether
a term existed prior to its adoption as a trademark is easily discoverable
through use of a dictionary.58 It is more logical and less costly to use
this criterion as an initial step in determining whether a plaintiff’s claim
may proceed.
In sum, a coined or quasi-coined mark requirement will do more than
vindicate Schechter’s view and society’s desire to reward investments
and creative efforts. Restricting the dilution claim will help to alleviate
concerns over dilution law’s potential chilling effects on free speech,
and it will have the practical benefit of efficiently reducing the
overcrowded pool of dilution litigants.

56. See Adidas-Salomon AG v. Target Corp., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1217 (D. Or.
2002) (citing increased sales over a five-year period and “substantial sums” spent on
promotion as evidence of fame); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows,
Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 613 & n.4 (E.D. Va. 1997) (finding
fame based on a survey showing that over forty percent of respondents recognized “The
Greatest Show On Earth” and associated the mark with plaintiff’s circus), aff’d, 170 F.3d
449 (4th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S.
418, 433 (2003), superseded by statute, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub.
L. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)); cf. Adidas Am., Inc.
v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1245 & n.11 (D. Or. 2007) (relying
on advertising expenditures and wide recognition of mark in fame determination and
excusing plaintiff’s failure to conduct a fame survey).
57. See, e.g., Pet Silk, Inc. v. Jackson, 481 F. Supp. 2d 824, 830 (S.D. Tex. 2007)
(finding mark famous within the pet supply and grooming market niche despite TDRA’s
general fame standard).
58. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,
1027 (2d Cir. 1989). An inquiry into distinctiveness is also an initial step in an
infringement case. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th
Cir. 1983), overruled in part by KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,
Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 116 (2004). In cases in which both infringement and dilution are
litigated, the distinctiveness issue does not add an additional step to the blurring inquiry.
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B. Limit the Dilution Claim to Marks that Are Unique
Within the Marketplace
A blurring injury results “when the unauthorized use of a famous mark
reduces the public’s perception that the mark signifies something unique,
singular, or particular.”59 If a mark is not unique within the marketplace,
there is no need to protect it under the dilution statute because the
purported injury has already occurred.60 This logic applies both to marks
diluted through third-party use as well as to those that have self-diluted
through brand extension or excessive licensing.61 In addition, a uniqueness
requirement provides the same practical advantage as the coined and
quasi-coined limitation in that it is an easily administrable barrier to
standing.

59. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030 (emphasis added).
60. Schechter himself recognized the necessity of protecting unique marks, as well
as the futility of extending protection to marks previously diluted through over-use in the
marketplace:
“Rolls-Royce,” “Aunt Jemima’s,” “Kodak,” “Mazda,” “Corona,” “Nujol,” and
“Blue Goose,” are coined, arbitrary or fanciful words or phrases that have been
added to rather than withdrawn from the human vocabulary by their owners,
and have . . . created in the public consciousness an impression or symbol of the
excellence of the particular product in question. Should the rule, still broadly
enunciated by the Supreme Court, that a trademark may be used on different
classes of goods, be literally adhered to, there is not a single one of these
fanciful marks which will not, if used on different classes of goods, or to
advertise different services, gradually but surely lose its effectiveness and
unique distinctiveness in the same way as has “Star,” “Blue Ribbon,” or “Gold
Medal.”
Schechter, supra note 10, at 829–30 (footnotes omitted). For a similar view that uniqueness is
one of three hallmarks of a mark deserving of dilution protection, see William G. Barber,
A “Rational” Approach for Analyzing Dilution Claims: The Three Hallmarks of True
Trademark Dilution, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 25, 40 (2005).
61. See generally Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law,
88 IOWA L. REV. 731 (2003). Professor Nelson’s thesis is that trademark owners engaging in
such brand extension should not be entitled to a dilution claim. Id. at 735–36.
Judges, lawyers, and even scholars appear to have assumed that trademark
owners are incapable of diluting their own trademarks—that trademark owners
are perfectly free to engage in acts that, if perpetrated by others, would be held
to cause dilution under the doctrine as presently applied. . . . Yet nothing about the
harm caused by dilution is limited to instances in which that harm is caused by
third parties. To the contrary: if we believe what we have been saying about
what dilution is, then we must acknowledge that the acts of trademark owners
can have the same dilutive effects as can the acts of third parties.
Id. at 788.
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It defies reason to suggest that an owner that shares a mark with
unrelated users is in need of a remedy to prevent the mark from losing
standing as a unique source identifier.62 Recall the example of Delta
airlines and Delta sink faucets.63 Surely the Delta airline mark is widely
known across the country by the general population.64 But if a new
brand—for example a Delta cosmetics line—entered the market, it
would be illogical for the Delta airline service to argue that Delta
cosmetics would cause dilution by blurring.65 Where noninfringing uses
of a famous mark exist prior to suit, it is inappropriate to claim the law
should preserve the famous mark’s ability to “signify something unique,
singular, or particular.”66
This argument applies equally to marks that have self-diluted through
licensing their brand for use on nonsimilar goods.67 In Frank Schechter’s
time, it was probably unthinkable that owners would voluntarily place
their marks on products unrelated to those for which they became
famous.68 Schechter cited Kodak bicycles, Vogue hats, and Rolls-Royce
radio parts as examples of unauthorized trademark uses that would dilute
famous marks.69 But compare these examples with the following
modern-day authorized uses: Adidas perfume for men and women,

62. See, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,
564–65 n.25 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Only ‘strong’ trademarks are protected by
dilution statutes, and the plaintiff’s trademark must not previously have been diluted by
others.”); Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1210
(1st Cir. 1983) (finding no dilution of plaintiff Astra’s local anesthetic when third-party
use existed prior to suit: “If the other registrations and uses of the ‘ASTRA’ mark have
not already diminished the uniqueness of Astra’s mark, [defendant’s] use of it on its
analyzer will not diminish it, either”); see also Milton W. Handler, Are the State Antidilution
Laws Compatible with the National Protection of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP.
269, 280 (1985) (“[A]ny reduction [in uniqueness] would seemingly constitute
dilution—there apparently are no minimum requirements with regard to the extent of the
dissipation. . . . We can avoid the difficulty, at least in part, if we confine the dilution
theory to those famous and celebrated marks whose distinctive quality is in fact capable
of dilution.”).
63. See supra Part II.
64. The mark thus presumably satisfies the general fame standard under the TDRA.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006).
65. In addition to airlines and faucets, an online search of the term delta reveals
that it also serves as a mark for a dental benefits company, a college, a storage service, a
bicycle parts company, and the list continues. Google, http://www.google.com (enter
“delta” into search field) (last visited Apr. 25, 2010).
66. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
67. See generally Nelson, supra note 61 (arguing dilution law should not protect
marks that engage in brand extension through licensing because these marks effectively
self-dilute).
68. See id. at 777.
69. Schechter, supra note 10, at 825.
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Barbie children’s shoes, and Eddie Bauer edition sports utility vehicles.
The mark owner in each of these instances profits by using the public’s
mental association with the mark to sell a completely different product
from a different source. From the consumer’s standpoint as an outsider
to the licensing transactions, there is no difference between Kodak
bicycles and Adidas perfume. Adidas, Eddie Bauer, Barbie, and
countless others have voluntarily given up the uniqueness that dilution
seeks to preserve and cannot benefit from the dilution claim.70 In
addition to a requirement that marks be coined or quasi-coined, previously
diluted, self-diluted, and otherwise nonunique marks should not have
standing to state a dilution claim under the TDRA.
Initially, it may seem unfair that an owner should lose its dilution
claim the moment it capitalizes on a famous mark’s selling power
through licensing. But the notion that an owner’s actions can cause loss
of rights is hardly new to trademark law. Owners may destroy their
trademark rights completely through incautious licensing,71 advertising,72
and using the mark in a manner that causes it to become generic.73 The
outlook for self-diluting trademarks is not so bleak. To the extent that a
generally famous mark does self-dilute through branding of nonrelated
goods or services, the public begins to associate the mark with more
sources and more products.74 Upon seeing the mark on noncompeting

70. See supra text accompanying note 60; Nelson, supra note 61, at 735–36.
71. Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1075 (5th Cir. 1997)
(stating rule that a mark owner’s failure to supervise the quality of goods offered by
licensee may result in abandonment of trademark rights).
72. Universal Frozen Foods, Co. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 389, 391–93
(D. Or. 1987) (denying trade dress protection to plaintiff’s curlicue French fries after
plaintiff advertised the spiral shape as providing functional benefits, which cannot be
trademarked).
73. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 511–12 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)
(describing plaintiff’s failure to prevent its Aspirin mark from becoming the generic term
used by the public to describe the popular painkiller as made by any company).
74. Take, for example, the Virgin mark owned by billionaire Richard Branson,
which designates over 200 companies. Virgin, About Virgin, http://www.virgin.com/aboutus/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2010). The Virgin mark operates in such disparate markets as
record stores, an airline, and a stem cell bank. Virgin, Virgin Companies, http://www.virgin.
com/company/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2010). When a consumer next sees the mark used to
designate a nonrelated product or service that Branson does not own, the consumer is
likely to be confused as to whether the source is Branson. Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab,
335 F.3d 141, 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding for plaintiff in infringement case and
finding “[t]he fame of the mark increased the likelihood that consumers seeing defendants’
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goods, consumers are more likely to assume that the product emanates
from or is affiliated with the source of the famous mark, and the mark
owner is more likely to succeed on a trademark infringement claim.75
As Professor McCarthy put it:
The test of traditional infringement is the very expansive one of likelihood of
confusion not just over source, but also over sponsorship, affiliation, or connection.
This test sweeps a wide swath of exclusivity for the owner of a strong and
famous mark. When a senior mark is famous and very strong, then the traditional
confusion-based rules apply to their broadest and most robust extent.76

Hence, a generally famous mark that has self-diluted will have a stronger
claim under infringement law than a famous product or service mark that
is still associated uniquely with its original product or service. Especially
given the trend of expanding trademark rights beyond the classic
“palming off” scenario,77 losing entitlement to a dilution claim will not
leave self-diluted, generally famous marks without remedy.
Just as with the coined or quasi-coined mark requirement, a uniqueness
requirement provides an efficient means of reducing the pool of dilution
litigants.78 A plaintiff could show, and a court could easily verify,
whether a mark is unique through a common trademark search.79 By
substituting uniqueness and coined term requirements for the fame
inquiry as a threshold for standing, Congress and the courts will achieve
two important objectives by ensuring a merit-based application of the
dilution law while simultaneously limiting litigation to these more deserving
marks.

shops selling telephones under the mark VIRGIN would assume incorrectly that defendants’
shops were a part of plaintiff’s organization”).
75. In Mead Data Central, the district court found Lexus did not infringe the Lexis
mark due to the completely unrelated and noncompetitive nature of the parties’ products.
Mead Data Cent. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1031, 1040 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev’d, 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989). However, the court expressly
noted that “if Toyota were involved in the manufacture or sale of computers, computer
software, data processing, or computerized databases, this conclusion would likely change.”
Id. In other words, had Toyota previously expanded into the computer industry, the
introduction of a similar sounding mark into the field would likely confuse consumers as
to whether the parties were somehow affiliated.
76. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 24:74. Practically speaking, losing protection
under the dilution law in this situation will not greatly affect mark owners because the
remedy for both dilution and infringement is an injunction. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114,
1125(c) (2006).
77. See supra note 21.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 52–54.
79. Nelson, supra note 61, at 791.
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IV. EXPANDING FEDERAL DILUTION LAW TO INCLUDE
MARKET NICHE TRADEMARKS
This section presents an affirmative argument for expanding federal
dilution law to include famous market niche trademarks. To illuminate
the discussion, this section begins by proposing guidelines for defining
market niche fame. It discusses how including market niche trademarks
under federal dilution law vindicates the notion of reward for deserving
marks and explains why these marks may be more appropriate candidates
for access to the dilution claim under the proposed uniqueness
limitation.80 Finally, this section questions the commonly accepted theory
of injury to blurred marks and suggests an alternate theory of reduced
leverage in licensing negotiations. It concludes by demonstrating how
this alternate theory dispels a common argument against allowing
market niche trademarks access to the dilution claim.
A. Proposed Definition of Market Niche Fame
To qualify for protection under federal dilution law, a famous product
or service niche mark should be nationally recognized by a vast majority
of consumers or professionals within a broad market segment. Marks
recognized only in a restricted geographic area should not have access to
a federal remedy given the existence of state dilution laws.81 The niche
should encompass very broad categories, such as “medical,” “life sciences/
basic research,” “law,” or “financial” markets. Under this proposed
definition, a mark widely recognized only within a narrower niche or
subcategory such as “home lending,” “diabetes research,” or “insurance
law” would not qualify for protection under the TDRA. These narrower
niches threaten to overly expand the federal dilution claim.
The first step in recognizing fame within a particular market segment
is to define the niche. Because dilution law theoretically grants strong
exclusionary rights, a dilution cause of action should require a mark to
be famous within a broadly defined niche.82 Courts should resist efforts
of plaintiffs to define their marks as famous within narrow subniches.83
80. See supra Part III.B.
81. See infra notes 160–161 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
83. One commentator alluded to this concern in applauding the TDRA’s general
fame standard: “Everyone is presumably famous at his or her breakfast table.” Gregory
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This will help ensure that only the most deserving brands have access to
the dilution claim because only those marks that have achieved a high
level of recognition in the minds of a large number of consumers will
qualify.84
Recall the controversy that unfolded between the owners of the Lexis
and Lexus marks in the late 1980s.85 In that case the owner of the mark
for Lexis legal research services sued Toyota over its Lexus brand of
luxury automobiles.86 The court found that Lexis was widely recognized
within the legal market, with 76% of attorneys associating the mark with
the well-known legal research service.87 However, only 1% of the
general population associated the Lexis mark with the legal research
service.88 This, combined with the finding that Lexis devoted the “bulk”
of its advertising budget to reaching attorneys through professional
journals, proved to the court that the mark was famous only within a
market niche.89
Under this Comment’s proposed definition, Lexis would qualify as a
famous niche mark within a broadly defined legal market niche. The
Mead Data Central court found that Lexis was recognized by 76% of
attorneys.90 Considering that the case was decided in 1989, before
widespread use of the Internet, it is probably safe to assume that today
far closer to 100% of attorneys, legal services professionals, and
academics in the United States recognize this mark and associate it with
legal research services. This is a perfect example of a mark that is
almost universally recognized and thus very famous on a national level
within a broadly defined market niche.
Similarly, the court in Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc. required
and found Louis Vuitton’s Monogram Multicolore trade dress to be
generally famous.91 However, the court cited facts and used language
that more appropriately support a finding of market niche fame. At issue
in this case was a particular trademarked design used on a line of

Krakau, Dilution Redux: The New FTDRA, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., June 2007, at 1,
2.
84. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text.
86. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,
1027 (2d Cir. 1989).
87. Id. at 1028.
88. Id. at 1031.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1028.
91. Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 368, 391 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
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handbags.92 In its fame analysis, the court cited a women’s fashion
magazine, Women’s Wear Daily, which had recognized Louis Vuitton as
the “ninth most recognized accessory brand in the United States,” due in
part to the success of the Monogram Multicolore handbag design.93 This
fact, combined with Louis Vuitton’s advertising expenditures in
promoting the mark, convinced the court “that, far beyond a narrow,
niche market, the Monogram Multicolore mark achieved a high level of
fame in the broad fashion market.”94
The Malletier holding regarding fame is perfectly compatible with a
properly defined broad market niche. Although the Louis Vuitton brand
is generally famous, it may not be safe to assume the general consuming
public is familiar with a particular handbag design. Instead, the court
cited evidence of fame from a publication within the fashion market
niche.95 It then went on to hold the mark famous within the “broad fashion
market.”96 As with Lexis, the Monogram Multicolore handbag design is
an excellent example of a mark that is well recognized on a national
level within a broadly defined market niche.
The second factor in a proper definition of market niche fame is the
extent to which consumers within the niche must recognize the mark.
The vast majority of consumers within a given niche should recognize
the mark, and recognition should be nationwide. The Mead Data
Central survey found that 76% of attorneys recognized the Lexis mark.97
This percentage indicates that a considerable majority of professionals
within the legal industry recognized the mark.98 However, although
surveys may help to establish consumer recognition, they are routinely
attacked for methodological error and should not be the sole method

92. Id. at 372. The Louis Vuitton brand itself was not at issue. The Louis Vuitton
brand enjoys worldwide recognition. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Haute Diggity
Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 264 (4th Cir. 2007).
93. Malletier, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 391 n.151.
94. Id. at 391.
95. Id. at 391 n.151.
96. Id. at 391.
97. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,
1028 (2d Cir. 1989).
98. The Lexis survey apparently questioned only attorneys and accountants. To
get a more accurate picture of the brand’s fame within the legal market, a more appropriate
survey would have questioned all consumers who operate within the niche legal market,
including legal staff, academics, and students.
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upon which a court relies.99 The fame factors provided in the TDRA
should each be considered in determining the fame of a market niche
trademark.100 If courts maintain stringent requirements of both a broadly
defined niche and a high degree of consumer recognition across the
United States, they will develop precedents that will be useful in
determining the fame of comparable brands in comparable market niches.
B. Owners of Famous Market Niche Trademarks
“Deserve” Dilution Protection
A common theme in much of the dilution literature places emphasis
on the notion that famous marks “deserve” additional rights because they
have “earned” them by becoming strong and widely recognized.101
Courts inevitably cite large advertising expenditures as evidence of
fame.102 The TDRA also accepts the notion that gaining brand recognition
through advertising is ground for access to the dilution claim.103 In
addition, a mark “earns” recognition by designating quality products that

99. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 879 (9th Cir.
1999) (rejecting consumer survey for design flaws).
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006).
101. See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see also Times Mirror Magazines,
Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 174 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Congress was
quite clear . . . that the FTDA was . . . designed for situations . . . in which a truly famous
mark on dissimilar products deserves, but cannot receive, protection under infringement
law . . . .”); Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 875 (“‘We believe that a limited category of
trademarks, those which are truly famous and registered, are deserving of national
protection from dilution.’” (quoting United States Trademark Association Trademark Review
Commission, Report & Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77
TRADEMARK REP. 375, 455 (1987))); Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d
457, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“‘Clearly, nationally famous marks like . . . TIFFANY . . .
have the strong, distinctive quality of fame which is deserving of protection from
dilution.’” (quoting 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 24:87)).
102. See, e.g., Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 368, 391
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding plaintiff’s mark generally famous based almost exclusively on
evidence of advertising expenses and promotional efforts); Adidas Am., Inc. v. Payless
Shoesource, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1245 (D. Or. 2007) (citing Adidas-Salomon AG
v. Target Corp., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1216 (D. Or. 2002)) (accepting plaintiff’s “huge”
expenditures in advertising and promotion of its mark as evidence of fame); Nike, Inc. v.
Nikepal Int’l, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-1468-GEB-JFM, 2007 WL 2782030, at *5 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 18, 2007) (citing advertising and promotion expenses exceeding one billion dollars
as a factor in plaintiff’s favor in fame analysis).
103. The TDRA lists four factors to be used in determining whether a mark is
generally famous. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). The first factor directly addresses advertising
efforts, while the second may indirectly take advertising into account because it relates to
volume of sales. Id.
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consumers select over competing products.104 But the owners of famous
market niche trademarks have probably worked and spent as much as, if
not more than, generally famous marks in developing and advertising a
successful brand. Niche marks may be subject to stronger competitive
forces, and owners may invest heavily in promotional materials.105
Furthermore, because the mark does not benefit from ubiquitous
placement or exposure in popular culture, a famous niche mark likely
earns most of its goodwill through the actual quality of its product or
service.106 A dilution cause of action should entitle these famous market
niche trademarks to the strong rights and associated competitive
advantages they deserve.107

104. See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 2:35 (explaining facilitation of
consumer choice as one of the economic functions of trademarks).
105. See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d at 165–66 (citing television, radio
advertisements, and direct mail solicitations as support in holding plaintiff’s mark
famous in the niche “sports periodicals market”); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1031, 1036–42 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding Lexis to be
known within a market niche of attorneys and accountants, based in part on plaintiff’s
$3.8 million in advertising expenses in 1987), rev’d, 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989).
106. As an example, consumers may see a product such as Evian bottled water
anywhere—not only is it advertised broadly to attract new buyers, even nonpurchasers
are exposed in grocery stores or when they observe others drinking from a bottle of
Evian water. On the other hand, Invitrogen is an example of a mark that is well known
within the life sciences community:
Invitrogen won in six [Life Science Industry Awards] categories, the most of
any company . . . .
....
The Life Science Industry Awards are given to top life science suppliers.
The winners of these prestigious awards are determined by the industry’s own
customers—scientists in biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies,
in government and academia who use the products day in and day out.
Cell Biology; Invitrogen Garners Six Life Science Industry Awards, 2007 LIFE SCI.
WKLY. 555, 555, available at 2007 WLNR 7926306. Scientists all over the country may
purchase Invitrogen oligonucleotide primers, but nonconsumers will never see them, nor
would a nonscientist purchase an Invitrogen product merely out of curiosity because the
nonscientist saw the mark somewhere. Although Invitrogen advertises within the life
sciences community, it is famous because scientists trust it as the source of high quality,
reliable experimental reagents. See Life Technologies, About Us Corporate Information,
http://www.lifetechnologies.com/about-life-technologies.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2010).
107. The goal of trademark law is to stimulate production of higher quality goods
more efficiently for the benefit of consumers. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 2:4. It
seems fitting to extend the dilution claim to marks that have become famous through a
reputation for quality, as opposed to those that have simply accumulated name recognition
through extensive branding on ubiquitous products and extravagant advertising practices.
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A trademark that has become famous within its niche is likely to have
done so by creating goodwill through quality products or services.108
Consumers within a particular market niche are more sophisticated than
the general public with regard to that niche and may have more stringent
standards requiring that the products they use be of the highest
quality.109 Brand associations play a crucial role in helping niche market
consumers identify those brands they trust most.110 As an example, an
average person who walks into a sports store may not have much
preference as to whether he purchases a pair of Nike or Adidas track
pants.111 Conversely, a scientist performing a molecular biology experiment
will absolutely take care to purchase the brand of reagents she trusts to
be of the highest purity, activity, and general quality. In a competitive
environment in which brands contend for a smaller number of more
discerning consumers, those brands that rise to the top through the
“creation and perpetuation of good will”112 belong to owners that have
worked hard to get there. A mark that has achieved fame within a
broadly defined niche has “earned” the additional protections that dilution
law has to offer.
C. Niche Market Trademarks Are More Likely To Be Unique
and Not Previously Diluted
Blurring occurs when the same designation is used to identify more
than one source, so it makes sense to restrict availability of the dilution
claim to truly unique marks regardless of fame.113 The general public is
not familiar with famous product and service niche marks, so it is less
108. Goodwill can be simply defined as the likelihood that consumers will return to
the same business as well as the likelihood “that they will continue to do business with
the old name.” Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Menin, 115 F.2d 975, 977 (2d Cir. 1940).
109. See, e.g., Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d
482, 489 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding that potential customers of plaintiff’s expensive camera
equipment in a specialty camera store are more sophisticated than the general population);
Novo Nordisk of N. Am., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 96 Civ. 5787, 1996 WL 497018, at
*8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1996) (reasoning that doctors and pharmacists, purchasers of
plaintiff’s and defendant’s insulin products, are a “sophisticated class” compared to the
general public), aff’d, 185 F.3d 884 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
110. See SCHERER, supra note 21, at 378.
111. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Action Activewear, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1060, 1066
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (concluding that consumers of casual sportswear do not “represent a
particularly sophisticated group of consumers”).
112. Schechter, supra note 10, at 818 (“To describe a trademark merely as a symbol
of good will, without recognizing it as an agency for the actual creation and perpetuation
of good will, ignores the most potent aspect of the nature of a trademark and that phase
most in need of protection.”).
113. See supra Part III.B.
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likely that they have self-diluted or that third parties have copied them.
These market niche brands are more appropriate candidates for the
dilution claim.
A third party wishing to benefit from a famous brand’s goodwill will
do better to copy a mark that the general consuming public, versus a
population restricted to a particular market, will recognize.114 Generally
famous marks are also more likely to have self-diluted through licensing
on unrelated products because to benefit from brand extension requires
that the general public recognize the mark in the first place.115 On the
other hand, marks that are famous only within a market niche are
unlikely to spark consumer interest in unrelated products or services
outside the niche, making them undesirable as potential licensees.116
Because of the reduced likelihood of self-dilution and third-party
copying, famous product or service niche marks may actually be
stronger candidates for dilution protection than many generally famous
marks.
D. Assessing the Theory of Reduced Selling Power and Implications
for Market Niche Trademarks
Dilution occurs when consumers perceive one mark as designating
two separate and unrelated sources, or loss of “the sharp focus of the
famous mark to uniquely signify one source.”117 This section examines
the theory of the blurring injury and expresses skepticism that it actually
results in direct economic loss to mark owners through reduced product
sales.118 If dilution does cause economic loss, it is most likely through a
reduced ability to force junior users to obtain a license. Rather than
protecting against reduced selling power, dilution becomes an additional

114. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 2:31.
115. See Nelson, supra note 61, at 735–36.
116. For example, if Mead Data Central licensed its Lexis mark for use on a
nonlegal product, it is difficult to imagine its reputation among attorneys as a trusted
research service would impart much selling power among the general public.
117. J. Thomas McCarthy, Proving a Trademark Has Been Diluted: Theories or
Facts?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 713, 735 (2004).
118. This argument, as with the entire Comment, is directed only at dilution by blurring.
Tarnishment could conceivably result in reduced sales if the famous mark’s reputation is
sufficiently harmed. However, it is important to keep in mind that tarnishment causes a
separate injury from blurring and may in fact occur in both the blurring and infringement
contexts. See supra note 25.
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exclusionary right that grants famous marks practical competitive
advantages regardless of whether consumers form a mental association.119
It creates the power to decide between excluding third-party use and
forcing others to obtain a license for use on unrelated goods. Market
niche trademarks, while creating a mental association for less of the
general population, deserve and will benefit from access to the dilution
claim.
In determining which marks should receive protection under the law, a
federal dilution statute should focus on the actual injury that marks
experience as a consequence of blurring. Because dilution is a derivative of
trademark and unfair competition law, presumably the resulting injury
relates to the mark’s ability to compete.120 In a free market economic
system, motivation to gain economic advantage through accumulation of
capital drives competition.121 To determine the actual injury that blurring
causes, one must look beyond theoretical harms and attempt to explain
the economic harm dilution law truly prevents.
The generally accepted theory of injury is that dilution reduces a
mark’s selling power.122 Not surprisingly, Frank Schechter was first to
articulate this theory:
From the necessities of modern trademark protection . . . and from the
decisions emphasizing the greater degree of protection to be given to coined,
rather than to commonplace marks, the following principles necessarily emerge:
(1) that the value of the modern trademark lies in its selling power; (2) that this
selling power depends for its psychological hold upon the public, not merely
upon the merit of the goods upon which it is used, but equally upon its own
uniqueness and singularity; (3) that such uniqueness or singularity is vitiated or

119. In Schechter’s time, “selling power” meant power to sell the associated product, not
the power to sell the brand itself through licensing and other brand extension practices. See
Schechter, supra note 10, at 819; see also Nelson, supra note 61, at 777 (“In 1927, the
vast majority of trademarks identified only a single good, or, at most, a single class of
goods. . . . This was the power of brands: they said one thing, and they did so in a loud
voice.”).
120. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916), superseded by
statute, Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, as recognized in Park ‘N
Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
121. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 1:20 (noting that the profit motive
always emerges as the predominant force behind the competitive process).
122. See, e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 n.9 (2003),
superseded by statute, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-312, 120
Stat. 1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)); Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan
Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Mattel, Inc. v. MCA
Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002)); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 1999),
overruled in part by Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433, superseded by statute, Trademark Dilution
Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c));
Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996).
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impaired by its use upon either related or non-related goods; and (4) that the
degree of its protection depends in turn upon the extent to which, through the
efforts or ingenuity of its owner, it is actually unique and different from other
marks.123

Schechter postulated that dilution weakened the mark’s ability to
“preserv[e] . . . a valuable, though possibly anonymous link between [the
mark owner] and his consumer,” leading to injury through loss of the
mark’s selling power.124 When a famous mark loses its status as a
unique indicator of source in the marketplace, the injury is not the loss of
uniqueness per se.125 Rather it is the consumer’s distraction that
interferes with the mark’s selling power.126
Many people find this theory of economic injury appealing—it seems
logical and presents a compelling reason why the law should protect
marks whose owners have invested heavily to achieve fame.127 The

123. Schechter, supra note 10, at 830–31.
124. Id. at 825, 833. The International Trademark Association, a strong supporter
of the federal dilution laws, also supports the theory that trade and service marks possess
a selling power meriting protection by the dilution laws. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of
2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 8 (2005) (statement of Anne
Gundelfinger, President, International Trademark Association) [hereinafter Gundelfinger
Statement] (“We felt that a federal statute for enhanced protection of famous marks from
dilution was needed because famous marks ‘foster a lasting psychological grip on the
public consciousness,’ have a value that is ‘incalculable,’ and possess an ‘unseen but
dynamic pull’ on consumers.” (footnotes omitted)).
125. See, e.g., Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458 (“[T]he end harm at which [dilution
law] is aimed is a mark’s selling power, not its ‘distinctiveness’ as such.”). In Ringling
Brothers, the court used “distinctiveness” to indicate uniqueness in the marketplace and
not in its legal sense. Id.
126. A related mechanism of injury put forth is that of increased consumer search
costs. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn
from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1198 (2006); Richard A. Posner, When Is
Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 75 (1992). Once consumers form more than
one association with a particular mark, they must take an extra mental step in figuring
out which owner is associated with any given use of the mark. Id. (postulating that
consumers experience increased search costs when they must “think for a moment”
before associating a famous mark with its product or service). From that point on, it
becomes “somewhat more difficult for consumers to associate a famous mark with its
owner.” Dogan & Lemley, supra, at 1198. In turn, the mark owner loses the ability to
“economize on information costs by providing a compact, memorable, and unambiguous
identifier of a product or service.” Posner, supra, at 75.
127. See Krakau, supra note 83, at 1 (arguing investment in a famous mark entitles
it to the exclusive rights afforded by dilution law).
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problem is that the theory is just that—a theoretical injury.128 Several
commentators agree that famous marks either suffer no actual economic
injury, or if they do, that it is nearly impossible to prove.129 As an
example of the near impossibility of discovering evidence of actual
injury, take the case in which the Supreme Court held such evidence to
be an essential element of a dilution claim.130 Husband and wife Victor
and Cathy Moseley owned and operated Victor’s Secret, a single store in
Elizabethtown, Kentucky, selling sex toys, lingerie, gag gifts, and pagers.131
When an army colonel saw an advertisement for the store and associated
its name with the nationwide lingerie brand Victoria’s Secret, he notified
the famous mark’s owners.132 The case made its way to the Supreme
Court, which resolved an existing circuit split to hold that the FTDA
required a plaintiff to establish actual dilution in order to prevail on its
claim.133 The uproar in the trademark community was immediate.
Commentators, backed by the International Trademark Association
(INTA) and trademark owners, criticized the decision as creating an
unachievable standard and not adequately protecting the mark.134

128. McCarthy, supra note 117, at 747 (“Much of the academic discussion relies on
speculation, with few concrete examples and no concrete evidence, that famous marks
will probably be damaged by nonconfusing uses. The problem is that talk about
antidilution law is too theoretical and abstract.”).
129. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and Dilution’s
Rocky Road, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469, 473 (2008) (“Some
scholars argue that blurring increases consumer search costs, but the limited empirical
data suggests that any increase is likely to be very small and probably not worth the cost
of a legal remedy.”); Franklyn, supra note 10, at 117 (“On its face, dilution remains a
harm-based doctrine . . . . The flaw in this approach is that such harm is always speculative
and exceedingly difficult to prove. One can never be sure, or even fairly confident, that
a famous mark is losing its selling power due to the use of the same or similar mark by
another.”).
130. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003) (imposing an
actual dilution standard), superseded by statute, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of
2006, Pub. L. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)) (creating
a likelihood of dilution standard).
131. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422–23, 427.
132. Id. at 423. The colonel notified V Secret Catalogue because he took offense at
what he perceived as an attempt to use the famous Victoria’s Secret trademark to sell
“unwholesome, tawdry merchandise.” Id. The Moseleys subsequently changed the
store’s name to Victor’s Little Secret, but V Secret Catalogue was not satisfied and filed
suit asserting infringement and dilution claims. Id.
133. Id. at 428, 433. By the time the case was heard on remand, V Secret Catalogue,
Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734, 737 (W.D. Ky. 2008), Congress had overturned the
actual dilution standard and replaced it with a standard of likelihood of dilution, codified
in the TDRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
134. See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, No. 02 Civ. 9377 SAS, 2003 WL
22451731, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2003) (describing Moseley dicta regarding how a plaintiff
might prove actual dilution as “not easy to interpret” and citing varying interpretations
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A look at the actual facts of the case illustrates quite plainly that the
actual dilution standard was primarily a problem because there was no
actual injury to prove.135 Victor’s Secret was a single store located in a
small town in Kentucky.136 The colonel who initially reported the store
admitted the reason he contacted V Secret Catalogue was because he
perceived that Victor’s Secret was attempting to trade off the famous
brand.137 Neither he, his wife, nor his daughter—customers of Victoria’s
Secret lingerie—took offense at the mental association itself or contemplated
ceasing to patronize the famous store.138 There was simply no proof that
Victoria’s Secret suffered any actual injury.139
In light of the above, direct economic injury to a mark’s power to sell
its products or services seems dubious and raises the question of whether
mark owners are truly concerned about decreased selling power.
Business owners have long understood the monetary value in trademarks.140
from lower courts); Gundelfinger Statement, supra note 124 (“By the time measurable,
provable damage to the mark has occurred much time has passed, the damage has been
done, and the remedy, which is injunctive relief, is far less effective.”); Marc L. Delflache et
al., Life After Moseley: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
125, 139 (2007) (criticizing the actual dilution standard for increasing confusion among
courts and uncertainty among litigants).
135. Professor McCarthy advocates strongly that regardless of the standard applied,
“[t]he extraordinary remedy of an antidilution law should require evidentiary rigor by the
courts.” McCarthy, supra note 117, at 747. Judges should not rely on purely theoretical
assumptions about what might occur but should demand persuasive evidence of a
probability of dilution. Id. at 717.
136. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422.
137. Joint Appendix Vol. II at 209–10, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537
U.S. 418 (2003) (No. 01-1015), 2002 WL 32102974, at *209a–10a.
138. Id. at 210.
139. To appeal even more plainly to common sense, put yourself in the shoes of the
average consumer walking down the street past the Victor’s Secret sex shop.
Presumably you would make a mental connection to the Victoria’s Secret mark, but does
that mean you will think of the sex shop as well as the famous lingerie store every time
you hear or see the famous mark? Even if you do, will that actually stop or decrease the
amount you buy from the famous store, presuming you were a customer in the first
place? Remember that the blurring injury—the extra mental step required each time you
see or hear Victoria’s Secret—is separate from the tarnishment issue. See supra note 25.
If Victor’s Secret lowers your penchant for Victoria’s Secret products because it creates
a negative association with the sex shop, Victoria’s Secret is injured through tarnishment, not
solely through blurring. When we question the likelihood of a mental association alone
having any practical impact on our purchasing decisions, the theoretical injury of decreased
selling power begins to lose ground.
140. See FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW
RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 38 (1925) (characterizing trademarks as assets, “often of far
greater value than the physical property of the business[es] in connection with which
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A strong intellectual property portfolio makes a company more attractive
both to potential investors as well as to other companies interested in
obtaining a license.141 If a mark has access to a dilution claim, its owner
has the ability either to preclude a noncompetitor from using the mark or
to force the junior user to enter a licensing agreement. In this sense, the
injury to a mark owner when dilution is unavailable is not an actual loss
of product sales; rather, it is a lost opportunity.142 A junior user avails
itself of the famous owner’s mark without the owner collecting a
potential licensing fee.143 In today’s era of licensing and otherwise
leveraging brands, perhaps mark owners are not as concerned with
economic loss as they are eager to avail themselves of the stronger
property rights and ensuing competitive advantages that entitlement to a
dilution claim provides.144
A common argument for excluding famous market niche brands from
dilution law is that because the general consuming public does not
recognize the senior mark, fewer consumers will make the mental
association that characterizes dilution by blurring.145 But if owners are

[they are] used”); see also Jerre B. Swann, Sr. et al., Trademarks and Marketing, 91
TRADEMARK REP. 787, 814 (2001) (describing a series of mergers in the 1980s in which
many brands were sold at high prices as intangible assets).
141. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 2:14; see also Jacob Siegel Co. v. Fed. Trade
Comm’n, 327 U.S. 608, 612 (1946) (trademarks are “valuable business assets” and the
“policy of the law [is] to protect them as assets of a business”); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s
Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1227 (3d Cir. 1978) (“The long history of the
development and growth of the companies involved in this controversy bears testimony
to the force of the biblical aphorism that ‘a good name is better than precious oil,’
particularly in the corporate and commercial life of this nation.” (quoting Ecclesiastes
7:1 (American Standard))).
142. See Bamberger Broad. Serv., Inc. v. Orloff, 44 F. Supp. 904, 907 (S.D.N.Y.
1942) (“[T]he courts have come to recognize that the use of a trade name by a noncompetitor may not only destroy its identifying qualities but also the normal potentialities of
expansion.”).
143. See Franklyn, supra note 10, at 145.
144. For example, the Vice President of Warner Bros. Entertainment testified in
favor of a strong property right in trademarks:
[T]rademarks . . . are no longer mere source indicators, but are symbols with
independent value which should be entitled to protection in their own right like
any tangible asset. . . . The basic principle is that the trademark owner, who has
spent the time and investment needed to create and maintain the property,
should be the sole determinant of how that property is to be used in a commercial
manner.
Madrid Protocol Implementation Act and Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995:
Hearing on H.R. 1270 and H.R. 1295 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 109 (1995) (statement of
Nils Victor Montan, Vice President, Warner Bros. Entertainment) (emphasis added).
145. See, e.g., 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 24:72 (“For dilution to occur, the relevant
public must make some connection or association between the mark and both parties.”).
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in fact more concerned about licensing transactions, whether or not
consumers form a mental association with a brand becomes unimportant.
The mark owner desires a means by which to manipulate interactions
with fellow businesses, not the mental state of its consumers. The
mental association argument against famous market niche trademarks
fades considerably once one recognizes that blurring itself probably does
not cause any appreciable economic injury to trademarks.146 Mark
owners view the dilution claim as a tool that provides a competitive
advantage to those marks that have invested and “earned” it.147
Trademarks that have become widely recognized within a broad market
niche have done so by producing a quality product that a sophisticated
group of consumers has selected over competitors’ products.148 These
marks have earned the competitive advantage that the dilution claim
provides.
V. EXISTING SAFEGUARDS TO MARKET NICHE TRADEMARKS
ARE INSUFFICIENT
A. State Dilution Statutes Do Not Adequately Accommodate
Market Niche Trademarks
Over two thirds of U.S. states have adopted dilution statutes;149 however,
state dilution laws often do not encompass famous market niche
trademarks. To begin, valid federal registration of a trade or service

The TDRA also requires an “association arising from the similarity between a mark or
trade name and a famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006).
146. Professor Farley puts it somewhat more strongly:
Can no smart attorney, judge, trademark owner or social scientist figure out
what dilution is and how to prove it? If not, why not? I contend that it is
because dilution cannot be concretized. It cannot be brought into the realm of the
real. It exists only in the realm of the imaginary.
Christine Haight Farley, Why We Are Confused About the Trademark Dilution Law, 16
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1175, 1187 (2006).
147. See supra note 145.
148. See supra notes 105, 111 and accompanying text.
149. As of 2006, the following states had adopted dilution laws: Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 24:77 n.1.

575

JOCHIM FINAL POST-AUTHOR PAGES (2) (POST-AUTHOR PAGES)

7/19/2010 9:24 AM

mark is a complete defense to a state claim.150 Thus although the TDRA
does not preempt state trademark law, the registration defense effectively
removes the option of proceeding under state law against any federally
registered mark owner.151 When claimants are able to litigate under state
law, the statutes are nonuniform and apply unevenly.152 For a mark in
use nationwide, such unsteady treatment reduces the value of any
particular court victory. Furthermore, injunctions under state law extend
only as far as the state’s borders, meaning that enforcement is irregular
at best.153
Most states have adopted a version of INTA’s Model State Trademark
Bill (Model Bill), with jurisdictions varying in interpretation of the fame
requirement. The 1964 Model Bill does not include any express
language requiring a mark to be famous.154 Nonetheless, most states
adopting the 1964 Model Bill read in the requirement of general fame as
interpreted under the federal statute.155 Although the few states that do
not read in a fame requirement under the 1964 Model Bill may provide
relief to niche product and service marks, this result is problematic for a
different reason.156 If courts require only distinctiveness without fame,
dilution swallows the traditional infringement “likelihood of confusion”
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(6) (2006) states,
The ownership by a person of a valid registration . . . shall be a complete bar to
an action against that person, with respect to that mark, that . . . is brought by
another person under the common law or a statute of a State; . . . and seeks to
prevent dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment . . . .
Any mark used in interstate commerce is eligible for federal registration. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(a) (2006).
151. The federal trademark statutes do not preempt state trademark law to the extent
that state laws do not permit acts prohibited under federal law. See La Chemise Lacoste
v. Alligator Co., 506 F.2d 339, 346 (3d Cir. 1974).
152. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4 (1995) (citing decreased forum shopping as
one purpose for enacting a federal dilution statute), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1031.
153. See MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 13 (2007), reprinted in 3 MCCARTHY
supra note 16, § 22:9.25.
154. MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 12 (1964), states:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark valid at common law, or a
trade name valid at common law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief
notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence
of confusion as to the source of goods or services.
reprinted in 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 22:8.
155. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.
1999) (“We have interpreted [California’s dilution statute], like the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act, to protect only famous marks.”). California has since adopted the 2007
version of the Model State Trademark Bill, codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14247
(West 2008).
156. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 24:78.
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test.157 So, when states read in the TDRA’s general fame requirement,
the 1964 Model Bill does not provide recourse to owners of famous
product or service niche marks. Interpreted literally with no fame
requirement at all, the 1964 Model Bill remains unsatisfying because it
threatens to engulf traditional trademark infringement.
Still other states have adopted the 2007 version of the Model Bill.
Section 13 more closely resembles the TDRA in that it requires a mark
to be famous within the state.158 It defines a famous mark as one widely
recognized by the “general consuming public” of the state or of a
geographic area within the state, once again excluding famous market
niche trademarks from a dilution claim.159 On the other hand, the 2007
Model Bill provides an express cause of action to marks famous in a
geographic niche within the state.160 Thus, whereas market niche
trademarks do not receive the benefit of either state or federal law, many
geographic niche marks do not require protection under the TDRA.161
Under the 2007 Model Bill, owners of trademarks famous within a
market niche are not adequately protected under state dilution statutes.162
Market niche trademarks that have achieved a high degree of
recognition deserve access to the competitive advantages a dilution
claim provides. As applied to famous market niche brands, neither the
Model Bill versions omitting fame entirely nor those adopting a general
fame requirement are a satisfactory alternative to a federal dilution cause
of action. Unfortunately, state dilution statutes do not adequately
encompass product and service marks famous within a niche market.

157. Id. § 24:78 n.5 (citing Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. Inc.,
426 F.3d 1001, 1011 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Missouri law)).
158. See MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 13(a) (2007).
159. Id. § 13(b).
160. Id. § 13(c).
161. Although the TDRA eliminated all forms of niche fame, Congress wrote the
statute with the idea of allowing geographic niche marks recourse under state dilution
statutes. Gundelfinger Statement, supra note 124, at 10–11.
162. For further argument that state dilution laws are not particularly helpful to any
mark owner, let alone owners in niche markets, see David S. Welkowitz, State of the
State: Is There a Future for State Dilution Laws?, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 681, 703, 708 (2008).
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B. The Infringement Cause of Action Is Inadequate To
Protect Market Niche Trademarks
Under a proper understanding of dilution theory, an infringement
claim and a dilution claim are not coextensive.163 Frank Schechter
originally envisioned that his new cause of action would apply only to a
mark’s use on nonsimilar and noncompeting products.164 A single
consumer cannot be both confused as to whether marks emanate from
the same source and at the same time be certain that the sources are
different.165 Because a mark owner properly pleads a dilution claim
when there is no likelihood of consumer confusion, the infringement
cause of action will not adequately protect famous niche marks against
dilution.
Of course, plaintiffs frequently attach dilution claims to traditional
infringement cases.166 But even under the misconception that blurring
and confusion may exist in the same person’s mind at the same time,
infringement protection is weaker for marks operating within a niche
market in which consumers are more sophisticated.167 The trademark
infringement analysis involves several factors, including sophistication
of the product’s or service’s consumers.168 Associated with this factor is
the rule that “[when] goods are expensive and purchased after careful

163. See supra Part II.
164. Schechter, supra note 10, at 830 (listing Kodak bath tubs, Mazda cameras, and
Ritz-Carlton coffee as examples of when dilution law would apply).
165. See supra note 27.
166. Some commentators point out that this practice renders the dilution claim largely
redundant. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. In the year following enactment
of the TDRA, all but one of the cases that found dilution also held that the junior mark
user infringed the senior user’s trademark rights; because the remedy for both causes of
action is an injunction, these dilution findings had no effect on the outcome of the case.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text. This approach to pleading appears to be supported
by the TDRA, which provides that a dilution claim may be asserted “regardless of the
presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic
injury.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
167. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 220 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“Consumers who are highly familiar with the particular market segment are less likely
to be confused by similar marks and may discern quite subtle distinctions.”), overruled
in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 426 (2003), superseded by
statute, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)).
168. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495
(2d Cir. 1961) (listing the following eight infringement factors: (1) strength of the
senior mark; (2) similarity of the marks; (3) proximity of the products in the market; (4)
ikelihood that the senior owner will “bridge the gap” between markets; (5) actual
confusion between products; (6) the junior user’s good or bad faith in adopting the mark;
(7) the quality of the junior user’s product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers).
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consideration,” it is less likely that a reasonably prudent buyer would be
confused as to the source of the goods.169 Because a consumer within a
particular market is more sophisticated with regard to that niche, the
owner of a famous niche market trademark may have a more difficult
time establishing infringement. 170 Arguing that infringement law
appropriately protects famous product and service niche marks cuts against
these well-established rules and premises upon which the infringement
analysis is based. Famous market niche trademarks deserve the competitive
advantages the threat of injunction provides, but they are without
sufficient coverage when their only recourse is to infringement law.
Because infringement protection is weak when consumers are sophisticated,
these marks should have access to the dilution claim.
VI. A PLACE FOR MARKET NICHE TRADEMARKS WITHIN
THE DILUTION FRAMEWORK
This Comment has discussed several issues with the overarching
purpose of creating a place for famous market niche trademarks within
the framework of federal dilution law. It has also proposed limitations
that are important because the goal of this Comment is not to expand the
overall scope of dilution law. Rather, it is to tailor the dilution claim to
encompass those trademarks that deserve and will be best served by the
rights conferred, while excluding marks that cannot benefit from its
theoretical protections.
This Comment began by addressing a problem that arises when courts
and commentators interpret the term dilution in its vernacular sense and
treat evidence of consumer confusion as evidence of dilution.171 This
creates a redundancy between the infringement and dilution causes of
action.172 It threatens to overexpand the dilution claim because it allows
a mark owner to plead dilution in addition to infringement by making a
successful showing that its mark is generally famous.173 But the blurring

169. Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 489
(1st Cir. 1981).
170. See, e.g., Magnaflux Corp. v. Sonoflux Corp., 231 F.2d 669, 671–72 (C.C.P.A.
1956) (relying in part on sophistication of consumers in finding marks not confusingly
similar).
171. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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phenomenon is distinct from and immiscible with trademark infringement.174
A dilution cause of action should limit the claim only to those situations
in which the junior user sells noncompeting goods and there is no
likelihood of consumer confusion. This restriction will not only comport
more fully with a correct understanding of dilution theory and the blurring
phenomenon, it will also restrict the current application of dilution law175
and thereby help to make a place for famous market niche product and
service marks.
The second problem this Comment raises is the current practice of
allowing owners of nondistinct trademarks to state a dilution claim.176 If
dilution grants exclusive rights to marks that are not coined or quasicoined, it raises additional concerns about removing vocabulary from the
public domain.177 Restricting the dilution cause of action to coined or
quasi-coined marks alleviates these concerns because it protects only
those terms that are highly distinctive and were not previously part of the
public domain. This limitation rewards owners for enriching the common
vocabulary while helping to create a place for market niche trademarks.
This Comment further suggests that the dilution cause of action properly
applies only to marks that are unique within the marketplace.178 Dilution
law as currently applied grants rights to mark owners that cannot possibly
benefit from its theoretical protections because either the owners have
licensed or third parties have copied the marks, essentially diluting them
prior to any lawsuit.179 This practice renders meaningless dilution’s
stated purpose of protecting a mark’s ability to “signify something
unique, singular, or particular.”180 An intelligible dilution cause of action
should be limited to only those marks that are unique within the
marketplace––those marks that represent the sole trademark use of a
particular term. A uniqueness limitation, especially when combined
with a high distinctiveness requirement, will provide a bar to standing
that is easily applied.181 Most importantly for purposes of this Comment, it
will restrict dilution law in an area in which it makes sense, allowing for

174. See supra Part V.B.
175. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006) (allowing plaintiffs to state a dilution claim even if
consumer confusion is present).
176. See supra Part III.A.
177. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
178. See supra Part III.B.
179. See supra notes 61–62.
180. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030.
181. See supra notes 52–57, 80.
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expansion of the fame standard to encompass famous market niche
trademarks.
In addition to discussing general limitations, this Comment proposes a
means to include those niche market trademarks that truly deserve and
will benefit from the competitive advantages dilution rights offer.182
Market niche trademarks will benefit from the dilution claim because,
unlike generally famous marks, it is less likely that third parties have
copied a niche mark or that its owner has self-diluted through licensing
for use on unrelated goods.183 Because market niche brands are not
generally known, they are less appealing to potential licensees.184 They
are also inadequately protected under state dilution statues, 185 and
infringement protection is weaker for niche marks that cater to a
sophisticated consumer base.186 These forces combine to put famous
market niche trademarks in a relatively weak position to force noncompeting
users to obtain a license. This group of marks will derive a real benefit
from the leveraging tool and ensuing competitive benefits that dilution
law provides. Consistent with the theme of extending rights cautiously
and to those marks that have “earned” them, a niche mark should only
meet the fame standard if it is widely recognized by a considerable
majority of consumers within a broad market segment across the United
States.187 This will help to ensure dilution law encompasses only those
marks that have earned its benefits through successful marketing of a
quality product.188
VII. CONCLUSION
Federal dilution law provides strong rights to those marks that fall
within its scope. However, it currently confers rights on several generally
famous marks that cannot benefit from its theoretical protections of these
marks’ distinctiveness and uniqueness. At the same time, the law
excludes a group of marks that would benefit greatly from the practical
competitive advantage dilution law offers. Certain limitations should

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part V.B.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra notes 102–107 and accompanying text.
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apply to the dilution cause of action: it should exclude product and
service marks that are not coined or quasi-coined, or unique within the
marketplace, and it should apply only against a junior use of an identical
or nearly identical mark if there is no likelihood of consumer confusion.
But in order to include those marks that have earned goodwill through
quality products and that truly “deserve” additional rights, these
restrictions should be balanced by extending federal dilution law to
product and service marks that are nationally recognized by a substantial
majority of consumers within a broad market niche.
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